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1 Modeling Wild Animal Behavior in the Laboratory: 
Scientific Concerns 
- Kimberley Jayne -
Behavioral research on non-human animals (hereinafter referred to as animals) 
can involve the study of their evolution and natural behavior, cognitive abili­
ties and psychological constructs, or welfare and response to stressors, among 
other areas of natural animal behavior. Behavioral research on animals is also 
carried out to model human behavior, for example in psychological studies 
and pharmacological models, as well as for comparative purposes to under­
stand differences and similarities between species. This chapter focuses on the 
former-where ethology moves into the laboratory environment to model the 
behavior of free living animals-however, some of the discussion is also rel­
evant to the laboratory animal model in general because of the very nature of 
using laboratory animals as "models". For further discussion on animals used to 
model disease or within pharmacology in particular, see the following chapters 
in this Volume: Archibald, Coleman and Drake (2019, Chapter 18); Bailey (2019, 
Chapter 19); Carvalho et al., (2019, Chapter 16); Greek and Kramer (2019, Chap­
ter 17); Pippin, Cavanaugh and Pistollato (2019, Chapter 20); and Ram (2019, 
Chapter 15). For more on animal models within psychology, see Shapiro (1998). 
In comparison to other scientific procedures, such as those within biomedi­
cal research, modeling the behavior of wild animals in the laboratory can involve 
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methods that are physically non-invasive. While it is true that some behavioral 
studies are accompanied by invasive measures (which can be anything from 
injecting dye for identification purposes, to drilling into the skull to insert brain 
implants), for those that are not, physical and psychological suffering may be 
overlooked. This can also affect the rigor with which the 3Rs are applied, with 
the implementation of replacement in behavioral research being of particular 
concern. Nevertheless, the welfare of animals used for behavioral research can 
suffer as a direct result of: experimental manipulations ( e.g., simulating pro­
longed presence of predators); marking methods ( Association for the Study of 
Animal Behaviour, 2018); from being wild-trapped and transported to a labora­
tory; or simply living in a laboratory environment can result in various degrees 
of suffering by impeding an animal from performing natural behavior, impos­
ing a chronic state of fear, or observing them at close proximity (particularly if 
they are a prey or territorial species). Moreover, research in the name of animal 
welfare brings about scientific concerns with studying wild animal behavior in 
the laboratory, as well as problems with the animal model in general. 
The first half of this chapter focuses exclusively on animals that are used 
in laboratory behavioral research to model wild behavior, what is typically in­
volved, problems associated with this practice, and how behavioral research 
has revealed scientific problems in the animal model. The second half of this 
chapter then addresses the ethical questions of whether scientific curiosity of 
animal behavior in general provides any justification for carrying out this re­
search in this first place, with specific focus on non-human primates (NHPs). 
1.1 The Origins of Laboratory Behavioral Research 
The study of animal behavior has a long history, dating back over 2000 years; 
however laboratory behavioral research became popular in the twentieth 
century with the rise of behaviorism, with research using animal models to 
understand more about the human processes of learning and memory and 
the comparative abilities of animals (Klopfer, 1993). Food deprivation was 
frequently used as a method to motivate laboratory animals to "perform" and 
is still frequently used today across behavioral research. For example, early 
studies by Thorndike in 1898 deprived cats of food and confined them in a 
"puzzle box", from which they had to work out how to escape for a food reward 
( Chance, 1999 ). In the 1920s, Pavlov used dogs to demonstrate the principals of 
classical conditioning: a dog was restrained and isolated in a room for use in a 
series of trials where food was presented with a neutral event ( e.g., flashing of 
a light), so that their salivation response could be recorded (Pavlov, 1927). Still 
used today ( e.g., Meier, Lea and McLaren, 2016), and developed in the 1920s 
by Skinner, the Skinner Box ( sometimes referred to as an "operant chamber" ) 
confines partially food-deprived animals ( often pigeons or rats) inside of a box 
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with a device they must operate to obtain a food reward. Sometimes animals 
were also given amphetamines to assess the impact on their behavior under 
these conditions (Dews, 1955). Laboratory research has also used animals to 
model other aspects of human behavior: Seligman and colleagues gave dogs 
electric shocks they could not escape to model learned helplessness associ­
ated with human depression (Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale, 1978); Har­
low (1958) isolated infant rhesus macaques from their mothers to raise them in 
complete social isolation, or with a "cloth mother" or "wire mother" surrogate. 
Despite studies with humans being carried out, which reveal human-relevant 
data, six decades later this type of research continues with infant monkeys 
( e.g., Massart et al., 2014). So has the use of animal models of learned help­
lessness, which have been going on for five decades, particularly with rodents 
( e.g., Greenwood, Strong and Fleshner, 2010; for review see Maier and Selig­
man, 2016). 
Alongside the rise in laboratory behavioral research, a contrasting method 
of studying the natural behavior of animals, known as ethology, gained popu­
larity during the mid-twentieth century through the work of Lorenz, Tinber­
gen and von Frisch (Bolhuis and Geraldaue, 2008; Klopfer, 1993). The purpose 
of ethology was to ask questions about animals in their natural environment, 
using non-intrusive observational methods or environmental manipulations 
(Klopfer, 1993). However, for the opportunity to study them close up and/or 
under controlled conditions, ethologists have frequently brought animals into 
the laboratory-now common practice in modem behavioral research-and 
used invasive techniques with free-living, wild animals. For example, early 
ethological studies used chronically implanted electrodes to stimulate areas of 
the brain (Klopfer, 1993); and homing pigeons were fitted with contact lenses 
(Schmidt-Koenig and Schlichte, 1972) and, more recently, had their olfactory 
nerve cut to study the impact upon their ability to navigate ( Gagliardo et al., 
2008). 
1.2 Ethology in the Laboratory 
In modern ethology research, animals are studied in the wild and in captivity. 
Animals that are used in laboratories are either captive bred or caught from the 
wild in order to study behavior seen in their wild counterparts, but in an en­
vironment where they are in closer visual proximity and where their behavior 
can be observed and manipulated under controlled conditions. The number of 
animals involved in behavioral research worldwide is unknown because many 
are not documented and, in the UK, only research that is considered to cause 
an animal "pain, suffering, distress, or lasting harm" (uK Home Office, 2012) is 
subject to licensing and therefore reported. However, potentially, a large num­
ber of undocumented behavior studies could be carried out that could still 
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cause an animal a degree of distress, even if the distress is simply a result of the 
captive environment or being observed. And even more animals may simply 
be housed in laboratories but not the subject of current procedures ( e.g., Uni­
versity College London, 2017 ). While some countries do not report behavioral 
research in their statistics, the most recent United Kingdom statistics show 
that out of 3,936,723 procedures, involving the use of live animals, 55,475 come 
under the category of behavioral research that causes, "pain, suffering, distress, 
or lasting harm" ( accounting for approximately 1.4 % of procedures) ( UK Home 
Office, 2017a). This includes research on mice, rats, other rodents, carnivores, 
pigs, sheep, birds, amphibians, and fish. 
Laboratory studies of wild animal behavior cover a wide range of research 
questions, including questions about their evolution and adaptations, de­
velopment, cognitive abilities, social behavior, and even how their behavior 
is affected by captivity, among many other areas. For example, fish are used 
in large numbers in laboratories (78% of behavioral research in the UK) (uK 
Home Office, 2017a); and even more fish are bred to maintain genetic lines 
( e.g., Greenwood et al., 2013), with some taken from the wild to test under labo­
ratory conditions ( e.g., Burns et al., 2016). Research can involve exposing ani­
mals to aversive stimuli, such as simulating predator presence to observe their 
anti-predator behavior ( e.g., Brilot and Bateson, 2012 ); manipulating different 
social conditions, for example, to monitor how males harass females (Killen 
et al., 2015); and assessing whether specific behaviors are indicative of pain or 
suffering (Braithwaite and Boulcott, 2007). Both NHPs and birds are frequently 
used for comparative cognition studies to study how abilities that are charac­
teristically human may have adaptive qualities for animals. For example, to 
study concepts, such as numerosity, theory of mind, language, economic de­
cision making, tool use, and memory ( Call and Tomasello, 2008; Clayton and 
Emery, 200s; Pepperberg, 2017 ). In laboratory studies of this nature, an ani­
mal will typically be within a confined space and given a problem to solve, for 
example, using an apparatus or on a computer screen, for which they would 
receive food as a reward ( e.g., Meier, Lea and McLaren, 2016). Some cognition 
research also involves invasive procedures, such as fixing recording chambers 
to an animal's skull ( e.g., Schechtman et al., 2016); or being restrained in ste­
reotactic frames ( e.g., Neubert et al., 2015), to take brain recordings alongside 
behavioral measures. 
1.3 Laboratory Animal Welfare Research 
Animals who live in laboratories are affected by their environment in ways 
that makes their behavior different from free-living animals. These behavioral 
changes can be negative for the animal, as well as for the scientific output. 
For this reason, there is a separate field of behavioral research that studies the 
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welfare of laboratory housed animals, where animals are observed and experi­
mented upon to ascertain how they deviate from their wild counterparts, as a 
result of the conditions of their captive environment. Therefore, not only do 
animals suffer as a direct result of experimental procedures but, because the 
stress and deprivation of a laboratory environment is known to cause welfare 
concerns, additional animals are housed and experimented upon in order to 
examine the effects that a laboratory can have upon behavior, welfare, and, 
ultimately, scientific results. 
For animals who live within captive environments the ecological pressures 
are significantly different from the environment in which their wild counter­
parts have evolved. Their surroundings are smaller, uncontrollable, and less 
complex than their natural habitat. They engage in social interaction that is 
distinct from what they would naturally experience ( e.g., in terms of group 
size, proximity, sex ratio, or hierarchy). Furthermore, they are prevented from 
performing many of their natural behaviors, such as in preparation for feeding, 
but are exposed to unnatural routines imposed by their carers (Bassett and 
Buchanan-Smith, 2007), including: being caught and handled (Gouveia and 
Hurst, 2017; Hosey, 2005); unfamiliar sounds (including ultrasonic noise from 
computers); lighting and temperature (Gaskill, 2016; Reardon, 2016); and even 
cage cleaning, which has been found to disrupt olfactory communication and 
increase aggressive behavior (Arakawa et al., 2008). The presence of abnormal 
behaviors is common in captive animals and is considered a direct result of liv­
ing in these environments. These behaviors can develop as a result of unavoid­
able stress or fear, as a frustrated response to being prevented from performing 
a behavior, or through lack of stimulation. The presence of abnormal behav­
ior is considered a significant indicator of reduced welfare. These behaviors 
can include repetitive locomotor stereotypies, such as somersaulting, pacing 
or body-rocking, bar-mouthing, and self-injurious behavior (reviewed in Ma­
son and Rushen, 2006). Laboratory animals can even experience "contagious 
anxiety" physiological changes that occur as a result of observing conspecifics 
undergoing procedures (Gewin, 2011; Lutz et al., 2016; Novak et al., 2013). The 
presence of such behavior is absent in free-living animals, making the justifi­
cation for studying wild-like behavior in laboratory animals questionable, and 
problematic when animals are used to model human behavior (for further dis­
cussion of how laboratory animal behavior and welfare impacts on modeling 
the human condition, see Herrmann, 2019, Chapter 1 in this Volume). 
Nevertheless, to understand more about abnormal behaviors prevalent in 
existing laboratory animals, experiments are carried out on more animals to 
investigate factors that influence the occurrence of these behaviors and ways 
to reduce or eliminate them in laboratory-confined animals. For example, 
to determine whether wild-caught animals might be more susceptible to 
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laboratory stressors, infant animals are taken from the wild to compare their 
behavioral responses with those that have been hand-reared in the laboratory 
(Jayne, Feenders and Bateson, 2013); to assess the effects of different enrich­
ments, some animals are forced to live in barren cages (Abou-Ismail and Mah­
boub, 2011); and to examine the effect of different social conditions, animals 
are exposed to various stressors, such as predator cues, to measure their stress 
response (Zoratto et al., 2014). 
Welfare research has shown that even small differences across laboratory 
environments can have varying effects upon stress and the expression of ab­
normal behavior and development. For example, monkeys that are separated 
from their mothers and raised by their peers display abnormal behaviors 
later in life, as well as long lasting effects on their stress hormones, compared 
to those who do not experience early maternal separation (Feng et al., 2011). 
Differences in housing and husbandry, such as introducing an artificial bur­
row, can impact the expression of abnormal behavior (Waiblinger and Koe­
nig, 2007). Having visual access to conspecifics has even been shown to affect 
stress levels and cognitive performance (Harris, D'Eath and Healy, 2010 ). 
Research has shown that stress of the laboratory environment is not only 
associated with abnormal behavioral development, but also has long-term 
effects on abnormal physiological development and even brain functioning, 
with abnormal behaviors actually thought to reflect permanent brain dys­
function (Knight, 2001). For example, the basal ganglia, responsible for mo­
tor control, show altered responding in rodents and birds displaying abnormal 
behavior (Gamer and Mason, 2002; Gamer, Mason and Smith, 2003); sensory 
and motor deprivation are thought to be associated with impaired brain devel­
opment (van Praag, Kempermann and Gage, 2000 ); and abnormal repetitive 
behaviors are considered to originate from chronically thwarted attempts to 
perform specific behaviors or to gain access to resources (Wiirbel, 2001). Psy­
chological stress can also affect the body in other physiological ways. For ex­
ample, sporadic noise stress administered to rats can encourage the display of 
abnormal rearing behavior, as well as impact their gut morphology (Baldwin, 
Primeau and Johnson, 2006) and the functioning of their autonomic nervous 
system (Burwell and Baldwin, 2006), among other stress-related diseases (Gas­
kill, 2016). In addition, being prevented from performing one's natural behav­
ior can result in reduced physiological condition (Makowska and Weary, 2016). 
Overall, animals living in the laboratory are vulnerable to abnormal behavior, 
physiology, and brain development. They do not represent "healthy" models of 
free-living individuals of their species, thereby questioning the validity of re­
search using these animals to model natural animal behavior within the labo­
ratory (Wiirbel, 2007 ). (Note that there are areas of research that indeed require 
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animal models to display conditions not present in healthy wild populations, 
such as in disease research, but critique of these models is beyond the scope 
of this chapter.) 
1.4 The Validity, Reliabiltty, and Replicability of Modeling Wild Animal 
Behavior in the Laboratory 
For research where "abnormal models" are undesirable, as is the case for mod­
eling wild behavior, the presence of abnormal behaviors has been identified 
as a scientific problem that can compromise a study's validity, reliability, and 
replicability; thereby questioning the wider knowledge that can be gained 
from such models. Experimental validity measures the degree to which a test 
measures what it is supposed to test, including whether the effects were in­
deed caused by the treatment (internal validity); and whether the sample used 
is representative of a target population ( external validity). When ethological 
studies are brought into the laboratory, threats to both internal and external 
validity are particularly problematic when using abnormally behaving animals 
to model "normal" behavior (Wiirbel, 2001, 2007). Reliability in an experiment 
means that the same result would be obtained from repeated observations 
or from multiple measurement devices. The likelihood that the outcome is 
reliable is reduced by using animals that show abnormal behaviors in ex­
periments. This increases the amount of interindividual variation in an 
experiment ( Gamer, 2005 ), particularly if that variation affects the natural be­
havior being modeled. The replicability of an experiment refers to the extent 
to which the results can be repeated, for example, across different laboratories, 
which is affected by the variability in abnormal behaviors from atypical 
models seen between different laboratories (Gamer, 2005). Gamer (2005) 
describes how the brain mechanism that produces abnormal behavior "can 
and does" affect experimental outcomes in behavioral studies that measure 
response latencies, cage activity, behavioral switching, and extinction learn­
ing; he shows that different types of housing and laboratory environments can 
affect the prevalence of these behaviors and, therefore, the validity, reliabil­
ity, and replicability of a behavioral experiment (p. 112 ). What is even more 
concerning from a scientific point of view is the prevalence of abnormal be­
haviors in laboratory animals; for example, it is estimated that 50% of labora­
tory mice display abnormal behaviors, which they start to develop right after 
weaning at 21 days old (Wiirbel and Stauffacher, 1994; Wiirbel, Stauffacher and 
von Holst). Therefore, a potentially large number of animals are being used, 
which are unsuitable for modeling behavior of the same species living in their 
natural environments, and providing results that are invalid, unreliable, and 
unreplicable. 
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Some experiments, such as those within animal cognition ( e.g., exploring in­
novative problem solving), over-rely on using a small number of individuals, 
typically raised in unnatural, barren or restrictive environments, as an exem­
plar of their species' cognitive capacities (Allen, 2002; Boesch, 2007, 2008; 
Leavens, Bard and Hopkins, 2010 ). This is particularly true for research using 
great apes. These experiments can involve the repetitive use of a small number 
of the same individuals, animals that have been exposed to countless numbers 
of trials with different variations of problems they must solve. While measures 
are taken to try to control for the effect of learning or environment, it is not 
possible to eliminate these variables as reasons for the findings in these stud­
ies; and, hence, they could explain individual differences apparent in studies 
using animals who have been used many times in previous research ( e.g., Tec­
wyn, 2013; Tecwyn, Thorpe and Chappell, 2012 ). In particular, there is debate 
regarding the epistemic legitimacy of drawing species-level generalizations 
from studies that use captive primates. For example, Tomasello and Call (2008) 
controversially assert that the cognitive capacities of captive chimpanzees are 
not affected negatively by their unnatural environment. To the contrary, they 
note that captive chimpanzees have repeatedly demonstrated a range of im­
pressive abilities not observed in their wild counterparts. In response, Boesch 
(2007, 2008) argues that the cognitive potential of enculturated chimpanzees 
is beside the point; the issue lies in making fair cross species comparisons. 
Boesch ( 2007) states: "The recent acceptance of experimental studies, with 
captive individuals considered as fully representative of an entire species, 
is based on the assumption that socioecological factors play a minimal role 
in the development of the cognitive and cultural abilities of the individual" 
(p. 3). Despite legitimate concerns of this nature, the results of experiments 
on captive populations are often considered-whether tacitly ( e.g., Povinelli 
et al., 2000; Silk et al., 2005) or explicitly ( e.g., Tomasello and Call, 1997, 2008)­
to be indicative of the cognitive capacities ( or lack thereof) of conspecifics 
across all developmental contexts. Indeed, extensive evidence already exists 
that different environmental experiences affect not only the cognitive devel­
opment of NHPs, and other non-human animals (see Nelson, de Haan and 
Thomas, 20061 for a review), but that of humans as well. For example, human 
infants raised in different environments perform differently on tests designed 
to evaluate capacities for spatial reasoning, theory of mind, and numerical 
ability (see Boesch, 20081 for a review). Furthermore, Boesch (2007) points out 
that the acceptance of captive studies as representative of species' abilities 
can strongly discourage more ecologically relevant cognitive studies with wild 
populations. 
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A laboratory environment can never adequately simulate the natural life 
of a wild animal in an ecologically realistic way and with the same ecologi­
cal pressures; frequently, the experiments they are exposed to, even for ethol­
ogy laboratory research, do not represent real problems for which they have 
evolved to solve (Jayne, 2014). While controlling variables under laboratory 
conditions allows their effects to be studied in isolation from one another, as 
well as enabling behavior to be studied close up, these measures do not real­
istically represent how they would appear in wild populations (Leavens, Bard, 
and Hopkins, 2010 ), and thus affect the external validity or ecological relevance 
of a study (Bailoo, Reichlin and Wiirbel, 2014). For this reason, some experi­
ments that are carried out to model wild behavior cannot always be replicated 
under controlled laboratory conditions (Jayne, 2014). For example, Boesch and 
Boesch-Achermann (2000) argue precisely this in relation to theory of mind 
research carried out in captive chimpanzees: 
No captive study has so far attempted to study the chimpanzee's theory 
of mind, but all have confronted the chimpanzees with totally new situa­
tions to pass tests to show the human's theory of mind. This may address 
the question of [the] chimpanzee[ s' ] potential, but does not answer 
questions about the theory of mind that chimpanzees use in their daily 
lives. If some of these tests did not demonstrate a theory of mind in cap­
tive chimpanzees, we should not be surprised but rather ask ourselves 
"What kind of theory of mind is adaptive for chimpanzees to acquire?" 
and "When do they use it?". (p. 243) 
1.6 The Utility of Ethological Research in the Laboratory 
In relation to the scientific concerns of modeling wild animal behavior in 
the laboratory, a further problem is the extent to which the findings are even 
desirable in advancing our knowledge of behavior in wild-living individuals, 
given the methods used to obtain them. This is of particular relevance for 
determining whether the gains of the research, in terms of human knowl­
edge about a species and their behavior, outweigh the harms to the animal, 
which appears to be played down when planning a laboratory study of wild 
animal behavior (personal analysis of UK non-technical summaries; UK 
Home Office, 2017b ) ,  although it should be a vital part of all harm-benefit 
analyses. 
Furthermore, while the 3Rs must be addressed for any laboratory animal 
study that takes place-at least under European Union (Eu) regulations, 
among other systems-the urgency with which they are applied to this type 
of behavioral research is minimal, in comparison to other fields of animal 
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research, particularly for replacement (personal analysis of E U  funding 
dedicated to the 3Rs for laboratory behavioral/ethology research, 2017). Any 
legal requirement to seek non-animal replacements is easily disregarded in 
behavioral research because animals are the target species ( Cuthill, 2007 ). 
Some non-animal methods are available for behavioral research and have 
been around for decades, such as computer modeling for analyzing shoal­
ing and flocking behavior (Huston, 1988; Mwaffo, Bu tail and Porfiri, 2017 ); or 
computer programs with virtual animals that can be used for educational pur­
poses (Graham, Alloway and Krames, 1994; Behavior on a Disk, n.d.); however, 
these may not be suitable replacements for many types of behavioral study. 
Thus, because the behavioral studies discussed here are specifically designed 
to model wild behavior, in close proximity and under controlled conditions 
not always possible in an animal's natural environment, the requirement for 
replacement is undermined and, as a consequence, the scientific concerns are 
given minimal weight. 
Although studying the behavior of wild animals in the laboratory is a small 
field of research, relative to other areas where animals are modeled, phasing 
out the use of animals for this nature of research is particularly favorable: first, 
because of the scientific reasons already outlined; and second, because there 
is an obvious replacement available for researchers to ask the same questions 
( or at the very least, similar and refined questions) about behavior, namely, 
observing the natural behavior of wild and free-living animals. And where 
the study of free-living animals is not feasible, researchers need to consider 
whether the scientific knowledge gained from using laboratory models is even 
desirable. In terms of harm-benefit assessment, more critical scrutiny by re­
searchers and licensing bodies should find that the harms do not outweigh the 
gains to scientific knowledge from attempting to model wild behavior in the 
laboratory, not least the ethical concerns (which are addressed in the second 
part of this chapter). This is a field of research where it is practicable to end 
animal use under these conditions and could be applied with minimal nega­
tive outcomes for researchers, who should still be able to continue their study 
under more scientifically favorable conditions, namely, with wild, free-living 
animals. 
1.7 Concluding Remarks 
Due to the smaller numbers of animals used, and with typically less invasive 
procedures, ethology laboratory studies often receive little attention when the 
3Rs are discussed. The necessity of the research, however, is a different mat­
ter; for example, in cognition research, efforts to test whether animals are 
"intelligent" focus on their abilities to show human-like capabilities, which is 
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irrelevant to their evolutionary history or ecological needs ( see Bekoff, 2013a, 
2013b; and the second part of this chapter, for further discussion). 
The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour (ASAB ) states that: " [i] f 
procedures used in research or teaching involve animals' exposure to painful, 
stressful or noxious stimuli, whether through acts of commission or omission, 
the investigator must consider whether the knowledge that may be gained is 
justified" (2018, p. 1 1 1 ). Ultimately, laboratory behavioral research shows us 
that the stress animals experience as a result of living in a laboratory impacts 
the outcomes of experiments in such a way that the information gained from 
these experiments may not be reliable or valid and, therefore, not justified. 
ASAB (2018, p. I )  also state that "Behavioural studies are of great importance 
in increasing our understanding and appreciation of nonhuman animals". 
Behavioral welfare studies reveal that laboratory animals are a poor scientific 
model for increasing our understanding of animal behavior and welfare and, 
particularly, for modeling behavior seen in wild animals ( Gamer, 2005; Wiir­
bel, 2007 ). In terms of furthering our knowledge and understanding of other 
animals, there are far more non-intrusive methods, such as ethological field 
studies where an animal's natural behavior can be appreciated for its own 
worth, rather than using animals for hypothetical human gains. The study of 
the natural behavior of animals is fascinating, and none more so than when 
they are free to express their full behavioral repertoire in their own habitat. 
Furthering our understanding of animal behavior is entirely possible using 
non-intrusive approaches whilst still being grounded in the scientific method, 
such as through direct observations, or even experimentally by incorporating 
environmental manipulations ( e.g., Jayne, Lea and Leaver, 2015; Klopfer, 1993). 
Although laboratory behavioral research may rarely come under the cat­
egory of causing "severe" suffering ( unless being carried out alongside inva­
sive procedures), for ethology studies; we have seen, from the first part of 
this chapter, that some experimental methods cause animals to experience 
psychological stress to such a degree that it can affect their long-term physi­
ological development. Even simply living in a laboratory environment can 
result in a sufficient amount of stress to bring about permanent changes in 
behavior, physiology, and brain development ( e.g., Makowska and Weary, 2016; 
van Praag, Kempermann and Gage, 2000; Wiirbel, 2001). Ultimately, a labora­
tory can never adequately provide an environment for an animal to behave in 
an ecologically relevant way for experimental findings to inform about natu­
ral behavior or evolved abilities. Accordingly, the continued use of laboratory 
animals for ethology research is not scientifically desirable or necessary, as 
well as being fraught with ethical problems, as the second part of this chapter 
illustrates. 
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2 Behavioral Research on Captive Animals: Ethical Concerns 
-Adam See -
The remainder of this chapter focuses on underrepresented ethical issues aris­
ing from behavioral research in comparative cognition or, more generally, the 
study of animal minds. As the range of potential topics of interest here is im­
mense, discussion is limited to the following: 1. behavioral research conducted 
in captive environments, i.e., zoos and research centers; 2. controlled studies 
on non-human primates (NHPs); and 3. research motivated solely by scientific 
curiosity, i.e., pure or basic research as opposed to applied research, such as 
theory of mind debates. Research in this vein has, to our knowledge, never 
been subject to sustained ethical scrutiny. The primary aim of what follows is 
to motivate this conversation. 
2.1 Behavioral Research on Non-human Primates 
Great ape and monkey species have long been staples of both behavioral and 
biomedical research in the United States (us)  and in the European Union. Bio­
medical research on great apes has been (mostly) banned in the E U  (European 
Parliament, 20101 Directive 2010/63/EU, Article 8; though see various safeguard 
clauses in Article 55); and in the us, where the Fish and Wildlife Services recent­
ly granted chimpanzees endangered species status (2015; more on this law be­
low). However, so-called "non-invasive" or "behavioral" research on great apes, 
and especially other NHPs, continues largely untouched in these countries. 
In the us, the Ape Cognition and Conservation Initiative in Des Moines, 
Iowa, continues to house, breed, and conduct behavioral studies on bonobos, 
many of which focus on multi-modal communication ( e.g., Taglialatela et al., 
2015). The Yale Comparative Cognition Laboratory in New Haven, Connecticut, 
conducts behavioral research on the origins of human cognitive abilities in 
a "naturalistic" indoor enclosure, "equipped with natural branches and other 
toys" (Leimgruber, Rosati, and Santos, 2016; see also Cohen and Santos, 2016; 
Rosati and Santos, 2016). Behavioral research on monkeys, involving functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), is also being conducted at Rockefeller 
University in New York City ( e.g., Sliwa and Freiwald, 2017). The Yerkes Re­
search Center (Yerkes) houses and breeds NHPs at both Emory University and 
a second location in Lawrenceville, Georgia. Their current population of NHPs 
is approximately 3,400, though it is unclear what percentage is used exclusively 
for behavioral research (Yerkes, n.d. ). Much of the behavioral research at Yer­
kes takes place in "sound attenuating booths" with computer touch screens, 
as well as a "foraging room" where monkeys "explore and learn in a large area 
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where food can be hidden and puzzles presented" (Laboratory of Comparative 
Primate Cognition, n.d. ). Recent behavioral research at Yerkes involves mon­
keys (e.g., Brown, Templer, and Hampton, 2017; Hassett and Hampton 2017), 
orangutans ( e.g., Diamond et al., 2016), and chimpanzees ( e.g., Krachun et al., 
2016). What is more, the Comparative Intelligence and Cognition Laboratory 
at the Language Research Center at Georgia State University conducts a wide 
range of comparative experiments on chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys, rhe­
sus monkeys, and human infants and adults. Nearly a dozen such experiments 
were conducted in 2016, with comparable numbers in previous years, focusing 
on topics, such as numerical cognition, metacognition, strategic economic in­
teractions, prospective memory and planning, self-control and delay of grati­
fication, and perceptual and cognitive illusions ( Comparative Intelligence and 
Cognition Laboratory, n.d. ). 
Behavioral research on theory of mind, cognitive bias, cooperation, and 
fairness, among other areas, is also regularly conducted at zoos, such as Zoo 
Atlanta, which houses the largest population of gorillas, orangutans, and drill 
monkeys in the us (Zoo Atlanta, n.d.); and the Lester E. Fisher Center for the 
Study and Conservation of Apes at the Lincoln Park Zoo, which publishes a 
wealth of studies on sociocognitive abilities in chimpanzees ( e.g., Brosnan 
et al., 2015; Hopper et al., 2015). Finally, behavioral research on NHPs in the 
us is also performed at.field stations, such as the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) Animal Center at the Laboratory of Comparative Ethology in Poolesville, 
Maryland ( e.g., Dettmer et al., 2016b; Wooddell et al., 2017 ). This field station is 
a five acre "naturalistic" environment from which primates are temporarily re­
moved for reasons, such as manipulating group dynamics ( e.g., "rank changes 
and troop stability" ) in their absence ( e.g., Wooddell et al., 2017 ). Some studies 
involve separation of infant macaques from their mothers ( e.g., Ferrari et al., 
2009) for up to five intervals during the first month of their lives, while others 
do not ( e.g., Dettmer et al., 2016a). 
In the E U, the most prominent institution for behavioral research is the Wolf­
gang Kohler Primate Research Center (Pongoland) in Leipzig, Germany, which 
houses 41 great apes. Notable recent studies include, the false-belief experi­
ments of Krupenye et al. (2016) and Kano et al. (2017), which are the first tests 
in over 40 years of research on this subject, to demonstrate that apes possess 
an understanding of reality-incongruent mental states in others. The capacity 
to attribute false beliefs has long been the litmus test for whether chimpanzees 
possess a theory of mind, making these studies particularly significant. 
The above survey of contemporary behavioral research on NHPs is hardly 
exhaustive, but it gives the reader a sufficient idea of the types of research un­
der discussion here. Behavioral research is not easy to define. It can range from 
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"purely-observational" research in the field, to controlled experimental trials in 
captive environments involving touch screens, "non-invasive" neural imaging, 
and competitive and collaborative activities with humans and conspecifics. 
It mostly occurs in zoos, sanctuaries, and research centers (laboratories with 
"naturalistic" enclosures). A great advantage of the mode of argumentation 
that follows is that concrete definitions are unnecessary. Both the moral princi­
ple presented below as well as the challenge that results from this principle are 
intended to apply to behavioral research in all of its iterations. As will become 
clear, certain behavioral research may be readily justifiable in accordance with 
this principle, while other behavioral research will not, and a great many cases 
will remain up for debate. 
2.2 Scientific Curiosity and the Ethics of Behavioral Research 
In comparative cognition, the vast majority of behavioral research has been, 
and continues to be, conducted on NHPs bred and raised in captivity (An­
drews, 2015, p. 164). As mentioned above, chimpanzees continue to be widely 
used in behavioral research. Yet, as Birkett and Newton-Fisher (20n, p. 6) state, 
there is an "urgent need to understand how the chimpanzee mind copes with 
captivity, an issue with both scientific and welfare implications that will im­
pact potential discussions concerning whether such species should be kept in 
captivity at all". Indeed, we share the concerns of Boesch (2007, 2008, 2015) 
and Leavens, Bard and Hopkins ( 2010) that there is a desperate need to grap­
ple with serious epistemic and methodological issues that arise from mak­
ing population-to-species generalizations, based entirely on the behavior of 
captive chimpanzees. However, the focus in this discussion is on an even less 
represented issue: the welfare implications of behavioral research on these in­
dividuals. While biomedical research on chimpanzees and other non-human 
primates is a widely contentious issue amongst philosophers, scientists, and 
the general public alike, behavioral research has rarely been subject to mor­
al scrutiny. Nonetheless, Malone and Palmer (2014, p. 33) are quite right that 
"although 'purely observational' research in the field and the zoo is often re­
garded as inherently good and only minimally problematic, complex ethical 
issues accompany research in both these settings". The same can be said for 
more hands on behavioral experiments in "naturalistic" indoor and outdoor 
environments at primate research centers. Over the past few years, behavioral 
research on chimpanzees has, thankfully, been the subject of several excellent 
papers (Baker and Dettmer, 2016; Fedigan, 2010; Gruen, Fultz and Pruetz, 2013; 
Hosey, 2005, 2008; Mackinnon and Riley, 2010; Malone, Fuentes and White, 2010; 
Malone and Palmer, 2014 ). This discussion does not summarize the myriad of 
issues that they raise but rather concludes by highlighting a crucial challenge 
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to behavioral studies on captive NHPs, which has been largely marginalized by 
philosophers and primatologists alike. 
In the opening pages of her popular primer, Fundamentals of Comparative 
Cognition (2013, pp. 1-2), Shettleworth highlights two motivations for studying 
the animal mind. First, there are various "practical considerations" for "address­
ing issues in conservation and animal welfare," as well as for the construction 
of animal models for application in fields, such as neuroscience and genetics. 
Research motivated by these concerns is directly relevant to challenges dis­
cussed in the early sections of this chapter. Of special interest in the current 
discussion, however, is the second motivation that Shettleworth discusses: be­
havioral research motivated strictly by "sheer scientific curiosity." It is clear, for 
example, that the longest running and most popular issues regarding animal 
minds, tackled by philosophers and scientists alike, are chiefly addressed at 
questions of human uniqueness. As Shettleworth ( 2013, p. 2) claims, "What uni­
fies this diverse field is the overarching question with which the modern study 
of comparative cognition began, how true is Darwin's (1871) assertion that 
humans' 'mental powers' are 'different in degree but not in kind' from those 
of other species?" The question as to whether Darwin was right to challenge 
this age-old, and still dominant, notion of human uniqueness is commonly 
thought justifiable for its own sake. Povinelli's work ( 2000; 2012) on chimpanzee 
"folk physics" offers a prime example of such research. Based on a series of ex­
periments on captive chimpanzees at the New Iberia Research Center ( NIRC ), 
Povinelli argues that chimpanzees understand the physical world in a way that 
is fundamentally different from humans. It is worth noting, in line with the 
first part of this chapter, that the ecological validity of Povinelli's findings has 
been subject to great scrutiny. Within a year of publication, three scathing re­
views of Povinelli's first book on the subject, by high-profile figures, appeared 
in comparative cognition (Hauser, 2001; Whiten, 2001; Allen, 2002 ). This second 
class of behavioral research (henceforth referred to as sheer curiosity-based be­
havioral research or SCBB research) presents a unique ethical challenge that is 
not faced by other common forms of animal experimentation. 
SCBB  research can be defined as, experimental, or purely observational, 
behavioral research with no expected, or foreseeable, practical consequences. 
The motivations of the researchers are essential to this definition. Povinelli's 
experiments on the NIRC chimpanzees were not motivated by welfare con­
cerns, nor were they motivated by future use in constructing animal models; 
rather, Povinelli and collaborators quite simply sought to gain knowledge as 
to whether chimpanzees understand the physical properties of objects in the 
same way that humans do ( or, in many other of their experiments, whether 
chimpanzees possess a theory of mind). The majority of behavioral research 
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on chimpanzees in comparative cognition is guided, first and foremost, by this 
basic desire to know for the sake of knowing (not to mention, of course, aca­
demic eminence, research grants, and the desire to publish). Further research 
and commentary is encouraged on this final point, as these overarching goals 
and features of academic culture are clearly relevant to the issue at stake. 
When Shettleworth (2013, p. 2) claims that while "practical considerations 
motivate some research in animal cognition," an "equally important impetus 
for studying comparative cognition is sheer scientific curiosity," she is evoking 
the classic dichotomy between pure and applied science. In so doing, Shettle­
worth is aligning S C B B  research with the former. Indeed, much of the animal 
minds literature tacitly operates under the banner of so-called, pure science, 
i.e., science without clear or direct practical implications. However, as is fre­
quently argued in the philosophy of science, a strong case can be made that 
science is never entirely pure, insofar as the practice of doing science is never 
entirely value neutral. The costs and benefits of research at every step of the 
way-from motivating the research program to deciding upon the means 
to conduct it-are the result of tacit or explicit value judgments, including 
"a prior judgment to which moral considerations are pertinent" (Kitcher, 2001, 
p. go; see also Gonzalez, 2013, for further commentary). With respect to S C B B  
research, for many experimenters who work in field, zoo, and research centers, 
traditional ethical criteria ( such as the 3Rs) appear "puzzling and irrelevant" 
(Fedigan, 2010, p. 755); occasionally going "so far as to identify their projects 
as exempt from the entire oversight process" (Malone and Palmer, 2014, p. 25). 
While much of the current ethics literature on chimpanzee behavioral re­
search ( such as those cited above) provides strong reasons to reject this per­
spective ( i.e., zoological institutions and field research clearly come with their 
own ethical concerns), in what follows we take a different critical approach 
by challenging the very basis for conducting some of this research in the first 
place. As these issues are broken down, scientific curiosity alone emerges as an 
extremely weak reason for breeding and confining animals. 
2.3 A Moral Challenge 
Practically all discussions of the ethics of animal experimentation ( under any 
guise, context, motivation, or environment) involve some form of utilitarian 
calculus, i.e., "one that tries to weigh the beneficial consequences of exper­
imentation with the costs associated with it" (Gruen, 2011, p. 118). The chal­
lenge that we pose to pure research facilities that breed and maintain animals 
solely to satisfy scientific curiosity is that such practices are incredibly diffi­
cult to justify on ethical grounds. There is even a crucial sense in which, given 
a utilitarian calculus, breeding and maintaining animals in captivity for the 
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sole purpose of studying their behavior is more difficult to justify with rea­
soned arguments than invasive biomedical experiments. Invasive biomedical 
research clearly evokes more welfare concerns than behavioral research, but 
the welfare concerns in the former can be, and often are, argued away on the 
basis of anticipated practical benefit. SCBB  research, on the other hand, may 
be legitimately said to evoke fewer welfare concerns. However, without any ex­
pected or foreseeable practical benefit to fall back on, convincing justification 
for breeding and maintaining chimpanzees in captivity-rather than placing 
extant chimps in sanctuary-is by no means obvious. Therefore, despite the 
wealth of knowledge attained from captive studies, a large amount (perhaps 
even the majority) of behavioral research conducted on chimpanzees (past, 
present, and future) is far from easy to justify. There is clearly a very real chal­
lenge present here worthy of serious consideration. 
Those who conduct SCBB research in zoological institutions, such as Frans 
de Waal at the Arnhem Zoo ( e.g., de Waal, 1998) and Michael Tomasello at the 
Wolfgang Kohler Primate Research Center in collaboration with the Leipzig 
Zoo ( e.g., Tomasello et al., 2007 ), are capable of offering additional justifi­
cations for captivity, e.g., the conservation efforts of their host institutions 
(see later discussion). However, it is very difficult to make a strong case that 
breeding and maintaining NHPs at pure research facilities, such as New Ibe­
ria Primate Research Center or the Yerkes National Primate Research Center, 
is morally justified. There are currently eight National Primate Research Cen­
ters in the us, not including many other similar federally-funded institutions, 
such as the NIRC . Some of these institutions have conducted SCBB research 
on chimpanzees, in addition to more common biomedical studies. Both the 
Yerkes facility (Guha and Sullivan, 2015) and, more infamously, the New Iberia 
facility (Gruen, 2011, p. 116) have been subject to charges of ethics violations by 
the Humane Society of the United States, ultimately leading to the retirement 
of 220 New Iberia chimpanzees to the Project Chimps sanctuary in 2016 (New 
Iberia Research Center, n.d. ). Crucially, the line of argumentation presented 
here is not contingent upon these more egregious cases, but rather applies 
more broadly to challenging the ethical basis for keeping chimpanzees in cap­
tivity ( even in "enriched" or "naturalistic" conditions) purely to satisfy scientific 
curiosity. 
2.4 A Moral Principle 
Let us proceed via demonstrative reasoning by agreeing to what we take to 
be an uncontroversial principle: interests motivated by the desire to satisfy in­
tellectual curiosity (with no foreseeable or expected practical benefit) should 
not compromise or outweigh the welfare interests of others, because the former 
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type of interests are comparably trivial relative to the latter. This principle is 
non-speciesist; it applies to research on humans as well as any sentient being 
capable of having interests. Importantly, it does not make all behavioral re­
search unethical. For many animals raised in captivity, releasing them into the 
wild would clearly not be in their interests ( Gruen, 2011 ). As such, for many ani­
mals already in social groups at zoological institutions, with conservation and/ 
or welfare-directed mission statements, this principle may readily promote 
their continued existence at the zoo, alongside other welfare interests of the 
NHP populations in question. For example, the Wolfgang Kohler Primate Re­
search Center website claims that, "The breeding program at the zoo is framed 
within the global strategy of the European Endangered Species Program (EE P ); 
and some research focuses on the husbandry and care of great apes in captiv­
ity". What is more, so long as the experiments themselves conducted in these 
environments can be convincingly argued to not violate the welfare of the test 
subjects, the principle is likewise not violated. The principle simply states that 
X's interests in bodily mobility, choice of social and sexual relations, general 
psychological well-being, and so forth, always outweigh Y's interests in satisfy­
ing their intellectual curiosity. It, therefore, follows that whenever X's interests 
and Y's interests are at odds, it is Y's obligation to explain why their interests to 
conduct S C B B  research are not trivial when compared to X's welfare interests; 
or, that Y's interests do not actually supersede any of X's welfare interests ( as 
researchers in zoological institutions may claim). That said, the challenge that 
we have posed, based on this principle, is vital to future research programs 
because, if the above reasoning is sound, it seems to follow that none of the 
S C B B  research conducted on the New Iberia chimpanzees, for example, was 
morally justified. 
2.5 Counter Argumentation 
Let us now consider several logical counter-arguments. To begin, some might 
take issue with the liberal use of the word practical and suggest, rightly, that 
while it is true that individual researchers may take themselves to be merely 
scratching an intellectual itch, the scientific enterprise as a collective effort al­
most always bears practical fruit, even from the most obscure research pro­
grams. If that is true, then the utilitarian calculus suggested here starts to look 
a lot more complicated. It requires the estimation of possible future utility of 
discoveries arising from research programs that, when undertaken, do not 
seem to have any practical value. As such, it is far from clear how such a utility 
calculation could be performed in any rigorous way. 
Our response is as follows. When defining the parameters of S C B B  research, 
we stressed the importance of researcher motivations because almost any 
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pure research could be justified on the basis of ad hoc practical applications. 
Consider the theory of mind research. One foreseeable response to our conclu­
sions is that work on theory of mind in chimpanzees does clearly have practical 
repercussions in the sense that this debate has been "central" to discourse on 
whether apes should be considered moral or legal persons (Lurz, 2011, p. 4). 
As such, a potential counter-argument might run along the following lines: as 
Malone and Palmer (201-4, p. 34) note, "caregivers to orangutans at Auckland 
Zoo expressed the idea that zoo animals serve as 'martyrs' for their species, 
suggesting that individual sacrifice is justified for the sake of the 'greater good' 
of conservation. Similar ideas are often raised in discussions about the benefits 
of field research, alongside the notion that 'knowing more' makes such re­
search inherently good". With respect to theory of mind research, those who 
breed and maintain chimpanzees at research facilities could argue that these 
individuals were, in some sense, "martyrs" for scientific knowledge that has, 
or may foreseeably have, practical applications regarding the welfare of their 
entire species. 
This potential response is strongly unappealing for a number of reasons. 
First, there is no clear evidence that theory of mind research has led to 
progress for chimpanzees attaining legal personhood. Second, there is already 
sufficient evidence that chimpanzees have at least a "minimal" theory of mind 
(Call and Tomasello, 2008), which should satisfy any salient ethical concerns 
regarding the concept. Third, it is hypocritical for anyone who is motivated to 
defend theory of mind studies at research facilities, such as the NIRC, due to 
concern for the personhood status of chimpanzees, because any presumed or 
potential personhood status owed to those research subjects would be violated 
by their being bred and kept in such an environment. Fourth, the chimpan­
zees themselves quite clearly had no say in their presumed status as "martyrs". 
Fifth, as Gruen ( 2011, p. 129) notes, "Virtually every scientific article ends by 
claiming 'that more research is needed'. This is how research scientists make 
their living". Theory of mind research is no different; in fact, the theory of mind 
debate has long been subject to a well-known gridlock since decades worth 
of experimental and ethological research have failed to mitigate widespread 
skepticism under the guise of the so-called logical problem. Proponents of the 
logical problem claim that all approaches, past and present, that have been 
used to evaluate cognitive capacities, such as the presence of theory of mind 
in animals, "cannot provide evidence for this ability even in principle" (Halina, 
2015, p. 474). In its basic form, the logical problem states that since all we can 
observe is an animal's behavior, it is difficult ( if not impossible) to determine 
whether an animal is predicting the behavior of others by means of mental 
state attribution ( e.g., of their underlying intentions and beliefs), or by means 
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of associative or conditioned response-mechanisms. Since there is little reason 
to believe that the logical problem will be solved (Andrews, 2015), ad hoc jus­
tifications of S C B B  research based on foreseeable ethical consequences of the 
theory of mind debate are clearly weak. Therefore, this same conclusion ap­
plies to any other research program commonly pursued at pure research cen­
ters for the sole purpose of scientific curiosity. 
Another foreseeable counter argument would evoke the "naturalistic" or 
enriched conditions provided by research centers, such as Yerkes. It could be 
argued that, given these enriched conditions the ethics of captivity for primates 
in research centers deserves to be situated on a moral continuum with the 
apparent "naturalistic" conditions at zoological institutions, rather than in a 
separate category. We agree. Our response is that zoological institutions, such 
as Pongoland, are certainly not off the hook morally. We have excluded zoos 
from the heart of this discussion because the costs and benefits of their sup­
posed conservation value is under scrutiny elsewhere ( e.g., Alroy, 201s; Keu­
lartz, 201s; Marino et al., 2010; Princee, 2016 ); but we readily grant that zoos and 
research centers exist on the same moral spectrum. With respect to this issue, 
we direct the reader to literature that explicitly considers the ethical weigh­
ing of zoological conservation efforts and welfare concerns brought upon by 
captivity ( e.g., Davey, 2007; Gruen, 2011; Hosey, 2005, 2008; Keulartz, 2015) and 
grant that the challenges raised here apply to S C B B  research across the map. 
Nonetheless, in the absence of any clear benefits for the animals themselves, 
it is evident that S C B B  research conducted at institutions, such as NIRC and 
Yerkes, cannot readily satisfy the self-evident moral principle that we have pro­
vided nor can any given utilitarian calculus that one may apply to justify this 
kind of research. Finally, it must be noted that the above is intended strictly 
as grounds for positing an important, yet critically underdiscussed, challenge 
for researchers to contend with-a moral dilemma that naturally arises when 
one attempts to justify SCBB studies-rather than a direct indictment of any 
particular researchers or institutions. 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
Those who engage in or otherwise defend S C B B  research necessarily face a 
unique challenge not confronted by other forms of animal experimentation. All 
debates over animal experimentation evoke some sort of messy utilitarian or 
consequentialist calculus, wherein some foundation ( firm or not) is provided to 
weigh the costs and benefits ofbreeding, maintaining, and experimenting on an­
imals for research. However, when it comes to breeding primates ( or any species, 
for that matter) purely for scientific curiosity at research centers, the calculus 
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appears to come out the same every time: s c BB research is unjustified across the 
board. The extent to which this conclusion may also apply to similar research 
programs at zoos is far beyond the scope of this chapter but certainly one for fur­
ther discussion. Also crucial for future discussion are the difficulties associated 
with justifying continued behavioral research by means of the conservation ef­
forts of particular non-sanctuary research institutions, where such research is 
conducted ( e.g., the Ape Cognition and Conservation Initiative in Iowa). 
The following proposal is a corollary of the basic moral principle put forth 
and defended above; those who study animals in captivity must demonstrate 
either that: 
1. The welfare interests of their research subjects are not compromised or out­
weighed in favor of interests derived solely from satisfying intellectual curi­
osity; and/or that 
2. The dominant reasons for breeding and maintaining animals in captivity 
derive more from the welfare interests of the animals themselves than from 
purely intellectual interests. 
The traditional act of breeding and maintaining non-human primates at re­
search centers cannot readily satisfy these fair-minded conditions. 
In terms of logistics, what exactly is being recommended here? We propose 
that the us Fish and Wildlife Services (Fws) may have already, in part, paved 
the way. On September 14, 2015, the FWS officially granted endangered species 
status to chimpanzees living in the wild and in captivity. As a result, in order 
to use chimpanzees for biomedical research, one must apply for a special per­
mit from the FWS. To date, only one permit has been applied for, which was 
granted in the interest of developing an Ebola vaccine for wild chimpanzees 
(Walsh et al., 2017). According to the FWS, however, behavioral research does 
not require such a permit. Such research would only require one, if it involves 
"actions that harm, stress, harass, or noticeably change the animal's behavior" 
(Grimm, 2015). If it can be convincingly argued via a combination of investi­
gative journalism and welfare research on captive primates that these conse­
quences do arise in captive chimpanzees, especially at pure research centers, 
a double standard could fairly be demonstrated here. Furthermore, "endan­
gered species status" is largely irrelevant to the key issue at stake. One could 
readily expand this general proposal in the following way: All biomedical and 
behavioral research-not only that which involves NHPs, but all research involv­
ing captive canids, birds, bears, rodents, and others-should require such a per­
mit. Research at zoological institutions would very likely be granted one, but it 
seems unlikely that future breeding and research programs conducted at more 
laboratory-oriented types of research institutions would. 
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